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Williams’ False Dilemma: How to Give Categorically Binding Impartial Reasons to Real 
Agents 
 
Abstract 
 
According to Bernard Williams, attempts to justify a categorically binding impartial 
principle fail because they can only establish categorically binding requirements on 
action by making them non-universalizable (Gewirth), and can only establish impartial 
requirements by rendering them inapplicable to real agents (Kant). But, an individual 
cannot be the particular agent the individual is without being an agent every bit as much 
as an individual cannot be an agent without being the particular agent that the individual 
is. On this basis, it is argued that, when the actual Gewirthian argument for a 
categorically binding impartial principle is presented, which Williams does not do, his 
objections to it do not hold and the argument establishes that agents are categorically 
bound to accept a substantive impartial principle that, at the same time, permits them to 
live lives that respect their own personal interests. Consequently, Williams’ dilemma is 
false. 
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Introduction 
2 
 
Immanuel Kant
1
 and Alan Gewirth
2
 provide the most concerted attempts to justify 
morality viewed as a system of rules for action governed by a categorically binding 
universal (i.e., ‘impartial’ or ‘objective’) principle.3  
 
As Kant claims, given the concept of a categorical imperative, for this project to succeed, 
it must be shown that there is a principle that is ‘connected (completely a priori) with the 
concept of the will of a rational being as such’.4  In Gewirth’s terminology, the principle 
must be shown to be ‘dialectically necessary’ for agents, one that they must accept on 
pain of failure to understand the mere idea that they do things for reasons, that they are 
agents.
5
 But this is not enough; the principle must also be impartial, which requires it to 
                                                        
1 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
[1785] 1998) and Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
[1788] 1997). 
2 Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
3
 According to Gewirth, the supreme practical principle is the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), 
which requires agents (those who are capable of acting for reasons) to act in accord with the ‘generic 
rights’ of all agents. The generic rights are rights to the generic conditions of agency (GCAs), which are 
needs that agents have in order to act or to act successfully, regardless of what their purposes are or might 
be, hence categorical instrumental needs. Kant provides several formulae for what he considers to be the 
moral law. The one that is easiest to relate to the PGC is the Formula of Humanity: ‘So act that you use 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, 
never merely as a means’. (Groundwork, 4:429)  
4
 Kant, Groundwork, 4:426. 
5
 I will use this terminology even when referring to Kant, with the understanding that no presumption is 
made that Kant and Gewirthians necessarily mean exactly the same thing thereby. 
3 
 
be shown that if it is dialectically necessary for one agent (Albert) to act under the maxim 
‘Albert ought to do S’ then it is dialectically necessary for any other agent (e.g., Brenda) 
to treat ‘Albert ought to do S’ as a maxim with which all Brenda’s actions (and maxims 
for action) must be consistent. So, there can be a categorically binding impartial principle 
if and only if the formal moral principle 
 
FMP: Act in accord with the dialectically necessary normative commitments of 
all agents 
 
is dialectically necessary for all agents, which is to say, if and only if the following 
formal principle of universalisation is analytic:   
 
FPU: It is dialectically necessary for agents to treat the dialectically necessary 
normative commitments of any agent as their own.  
 
As I understand Bernard Williams,
6
 he maintains that the Kantian-Gewirthian project is 
faced with a dilemma. According to his reconstruction of the Gewirthian argument,
7
 a 
dialectically necessary requirement for Albert is one justified relative to what Albert 
necessarily wants. Because Albert necessarily wants to achieve the purposes he has 
chosen to pursue, if he is not opposed to courses of action that threaten to remove his 
                                                        
6 Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), Chapter 4. 
7
 Williams presents an argument that he claims is suggested by Gewirth rather than Gewirth’s own 
argument. He does not tell us what the differences are, only that he thinks that Gewirth’s own argument 
fails for the same general reasons (see Ethics, p. 210, n.2). 
4 
 
basic freedom, he fails to understand what it is for him to be an agent Hence, the 
following principle is categorically binding on Albert: 
 
Sa: I (Albert) must be opposed to courses of action that would remove my basic 
freedom.  
 
Because Albert is a representative agent, it follows (in parallel) that the following 
principle is categorically binding on Brenda: 
 
 Sb: I (Brenda) must be opposed courses of action that would remove my basic 
freedom. 
 
But the reason why Sa is categorically binding on Albert is that he necessarily wants to 
achieve whatever purposes he chooses to pursue, whereas the reason why Sb is 
categorically binding on Brenda is that she necessarily wants to achieve whatever 
purposes she chooses to pursue. However, Albert does not necessarily want Brenda to 
achieve the purposes she chooses to pursue. The reason that makes it dialectically 
necessary for Albert to accept Sa (that Albert necessarily wants his basic freedom) is not 
the reason that makes it dialectically necessary for Brenda to accept Sb. Consequently, 
the reason why Albert is categorically bound to act in accordance with Sa does not bind 
him categorically to act in accordance with Sb.  
 
5 
 
If we are to show that there is a categorically binding impartial principle, the reason why 
Albert must accept Sa must be the same reason why Brenda must accept Sb, and not 
merely a parallel one, because the reason why Albert must accept Sa must necessarily be 
a reason for Brenda to act as must the reason why Brenda must accept Sb necessarily be a 
reason for Albert to act. According to Williams, Kant’s version of the project attempts to 
show that the reason why Albert and Brenda must consider humanity in their own person 
to be an end in itself is the same reason. Instead of making a dialectically necessary 
reason for action for Albert what Albert (‘a finite, embodied, historically placed agent’,8 a 
being with particular powers and circumstances who chooses to pursue particular 
purposes) necessarily wants (or needs to do to obtain what he necessarily wants),
9
 it 
conceives of it as what Albert must accept when he is conceived purely as one agent 
among others in abstraction from all properties that distinguish him from other agents. 
Kant’s dialectically necessary requirement is one that Albert must accept when he is 
conceived solely in terms of the properties that Albert and Brenda necessarily share that 
make them both agents. This says, Williams, is equivalent to conceiving of Albert ‘as 
uncommitted to all particular desires’,10 as ‘a rational agent and no more’.11 Constituted 
entirely in this purely generic way, Albert and Brenda are indistinguishable. So, if, as 
Kant claims, Albert must hold Za ‘Humanity (rational agency) in Albert’s person is an 
end in itself’ (from which it follows that Brenda must hold Zb ‘Humanity in Brenda’s 
                                                        
8
 Williams, Ethics, p.58. 
9
 It is not entirely clear which of these Williams attributes to Gewirth. As I will show, it does not matter: 
Gewirth holds neither. 
10
 Williams, Ethics, p. 69. 
11
 Williams, Ethics, p. 63. 
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person is an end in itself’), if Albert and Brenda are conceived in purely generic terms, 
we can interchange Albert and Brenda in Za and Zb. This entails 
 
Z: Any agent must consider humanity in the person of any agent to be an end in 
itself 
 
But, says Williams,  
 
We are concerned with what any given person, however powerful or effective he 
may be, should reasonably do as a rational agent, and this is not the same thing as 
what he would reasonably do if he were a rational agent and no more. Indeed, that 
equation is unintelligible, since there is no way of being a rational agent and no 
more.
12
 
 
So, those engaged in the Kantian-Gewirthian project can demonstrate categorically 
binding requirements on the actions of real agents only at the price of making them non-
universal and can justify universal requirements on actions at the price of rendering them 
binding only on ‘complete phantoms conjured up’.13      
                                                        
12
 Williams, Ethics, p. 63. 
13 I borrow this phrase from Frederick Engels, according to whom 
‘In order to establish the fundamental axiom that two people and their wills are absolutely equal to 
each other  ‘t]hey must be two persons who are so thoroughly detached from all reality, from all 
national, economic, political, and religious relations which are found in the world, from all sex and 
personal differences, that nothing is left of either person beyond the mere idea: person.  They 
7 
 
 
In this paper, I argue that this dilemma rests on the false proposition that Albert must 
either conceive of himself as bound only by the particular contingent properties that make 
him the individual agent that he is or conceive of himself as bound only by the properties 
that make him an agent like any other agent. I argue that the Gewirthian approach 
establishes the dialectical necessity of the moral law in a process of self-reflection guided 
by the following premise of judgment: 
 
PRJ: For me (Albert) to think of myself as a particular real (i.e., finite, embodied) 
agent, I must think of myself as having the particular powers and characteristics 
that distinguish me from any other real agents that make me the particular agent 
that I am; but, equally, I cannot think of myself as the particular agent I am 
without recognizing that I am a particular agent, and I cannot think of myself as a 
particular agent unless I think of myself as an agent, as possessing the properties 
and characteristics that make me and any other agent (e.g., Brenda) agents.      
 
The PRJ is analytic from the internal viewpoint of Albert; it defines what it is for Albert 
to be an agent for Albert. On this basis, I will show that Albert must hold SROa (‘Albert 
ought to defend his possession of the GCAs from interference that is against his will’)14 
on pain of failing to understand what it is for him to be an agent. Consequently, he must 
                                                                                                                                                                     
are therefore two complete phantoms conjured up’. (Anti-Dühring: Herr Dühring’s Revolution in 
Science [New York: International Publishers, 1966], pp. 108-109). 
14
 In this context, by ‘against his will’ I mean ‘against his contingent will to be (or continue to be) an 
agent’. 
8 
 
hold SROa on pain of failing to understand what it is for him to be the particular agent 
that he is. So, what is binding on Albert as an agent is also binding on him as the 
particular agent that he is. But, because SROa is justified relative to Albert’s possession 
of the generic properties that make him an agent, the parallel prescription, SROb (Brenda 
ought to defend her possession of the GCAs from interference that is against her will), 
that Brenda must hold, is justified relative to her possession of the same properties. 
Consequently both SROa and SROb will be categorically binding on both Albert and 
Brenda as real agents, which means that Albert and Brenda are categorically bound to 
defend any agent’s possession of the GCAs from interference against that agent’s will, 
which renders Gewirth’s PGC the supreme practical principle for real agents. 
 
This paper has three Parts. 
 
In Part I, I present Williams’ critique of ‘Gewirth’.  
 
In Part II, I outline the genuine Gewirthian argument.
15
 
 
                                                        
15 What I present is, in part a distillation of, in part reflection on, the rational construction and analysis of 
Gewirth’s argument originally presented in Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An 
Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth’s Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991) (which received Gewirth’s endorsement in his Foreword to this work), 
in the light of clarifications offered in Deryck Beyleveld and Gerhard Bos, ‘The Foundational Role of the 
Principle of Instrumental Reason in Gewirth’s Argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency: A 
Response to Andrew Chitty’, King’s Law Journal 20 (2009), pp. 1-20. 
9 
 
In Part III, I explain why Williams’ objections to this argument do not hold, with the 
consequence that his dilemma is false. I responded to Williams’ objections in my defence 
of Gewirth in 1991,
16
 and many of the responses I made in that work to other critics bear 
on William’s objections. However, I did not then articulate as clearly as I will in this 
paper the interrelationship between the dialectically necessary and prudential 
(categorically instrumental) commitments of agents. Also, I will present two arguments 
against Williams’ objections that I did not present then, one of which, the ‘Argument for 
Dialectically Necessary Mutual Recognition’, I have not previously formulated.  
 
 
I Williams’ Objections 
 
Williams objects to the following reasoning. 
 
 Since I necessarily want my basic freedom,
17
 I must be opposed to courses of 
action that would remove it. Hence I cannot agree to any arrangement of things by 
                                                        
16
 Beyleveld, Dialectical Necessity of Morality, especially pp. 166-171 and pp. 308-310. 
17He restricts his discussion to ‘basic freedom’. He indicates a willingness to accept this premise (see 
Ethics. 59). He does not mention the GCAs as such at all. Gewirth groups the GCAs under the headings 
‘freedom’ and ‘well-being’, and he differentiates basic, non-subtractive and additive freedom and well-
being. Basic GCAs are needed for the possibility of action at all; non-subtractive and additive GCAs are 
needed for successful action (with non-subtractive GCAs being needed to maintain an agent’s general 
capacities for successful action, and additive GCAs being needed to improve an agent’s general capacities 
for successful action). He gives concrete examples (life and freedom from coercion are examples of basic 
10 
 
which others would have the right to remove my basic freedom. So, when I reflect 
on what arrangement of things I basically need, I see that I must claim a right to 
my basic freedom. In effect, I must lay it down as a rule that they respect my 
freedom. I claim this right solely because I am a rational agent with purposes. But 
if this fact alone is the basis of my claim, then a similar fact must equally be the 
basis of such a claim by others. … In moving from my need for freedom to ‘they 
ought not to interfere with me’, I must equally move from their need to ‘I ought 
not to interfere with them’.18 (My emphases added) 
 
He concedes that the 
 
very last step that if in my case rational agency alone is the ground of the right 
of non-interference, then it must be so in the case of other people is certainly 
sound … [It] is brought into play simply by because or in virtue of … . That must 
be so if enough is indeed enough.
19
  
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
GCAs as are the means to life, like food and health); accurate information about one’s purposes is a non-
subtractive GCA; and new knowledge, and the means to it, are additive GCAs). Absence of a condition 
need not have an immediate negative generic effect (i.e., one regardless of the purpose being pursued) on 
action or successful action to be a GCA. (See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, pp. 48-63). Specification of 
the content of the GCAs properly belongs to application of the PGC not to the argument for it.     
18
 Williams, Ethics, pp. 59-60. 
19
 Williams, Ethics, p.60. 
11 
 
Consequently, if the argument goes wrong it must be at an earlier step, which is ‘when I 
first assert my supposed right’.20 His objection, therefore, is to the move from ‘I must be 
opposed to courses of action that would remove my basic freedom because I necessarily 
want basic freedom’ to ‘I must hold that I have a right to my basic freedom’ (or to the 
move from ‘I necessarily need basic freedom’ to ‘I necessarily have a right to basic 
freedom’).  
 
He provides three specific reasons for rejecting this move, though the second and third 
are presented as elaborations of the first. 
 
A.  The ‘prescription’ Pa, ‘Let others (B) not interfere with my (A’s) basic freedom’ 
is ‘reasonably related’ to A being an agent, as is Pb ‘Let others (A) not interfere 
with my (B’s) basic freedom’ reasonably related to B being an agent.21 But this 
means only that B is as rational in making the claim Pb as A is in making the 
claim Pa, and does not commit either A or B to refrain from interfering with the 
other’s basic freedom. This is because the ‘reasons that B has for doing something 
are not in themselves reasons for another’s doing anything’.22 Here, insofar as Pa 
is validly derived, it is derived from ‘I must be opposed to courses of action that 
would remove my basic freedom’ (read as ‘I am necessarily opposed to courses of 
action that would remove my basic freedom’, because this is derived from ‘I 
                                                        
20
 Williams, Ethics, p.60. 
21
 See Williams, Ethics, pp. 60-61. 
22
 Williams, Ethics, p.61. 
12 
 
necessarily want my basic freedom’). But then, Pa is reasonably related to A’ 
does not universalize to ‘Pa is reasonably related to B’, unless ‘I necessarily want 
my basic freedom’ universalizes to ‘I necessarily want your basic freedom’, 
which is not the case. 
 
B.  While ‘[c]ertainly I do not want’23 others to interfere with my basic freedom, if 
this fact requires me to consider that I have a right to basic freedom then surely I 
should 
 
more ambitiously prescribe that no one interfere with whatever particular 
purposes I may happen to have. I want the success of my particular 
projects, of course, as much as anything else, and I want other people not 
to interfere with them.
24
 
     
C.  If reason presented me with an exclusive choice between making a rule enjoining 
(requiring/positively permitting) others to interfere with my basic freedom (a rule 
granting others a right to interfere with my basic freedom) or making a rule 
prohibiting others from doing so (a rule granting me a right to my basic freedom), 
I would have to consider that I have a right to basic freedom, for, given that I 
necessarily want my basic freedom, I cannot rationally grant others a right to 
interfere. However, I might, consistently, consider interference to be neither 
                                                        
23
 Williams, Ethics, p. 61. 
24
 Williams, Ethics, p. 62. 
13 
 
permissible nor impermissible, whilst wanting others not to interfere, so do not 
have to consider that I have a right to basic freedom!
25
 
 
 
II The Gewirthian Argument  
 
Albert, as an agent, is defined as a being who does something (X) voluntarily in order to 
pursue the purpose (or purposes) E that he chooses to pursue.
26
 The argument proceeds in 
terms of Albert’s self-reflection on what it is for him (the particular being he is who does 
X voluntarily in order to pursue his chosen purposes) to be an agent (a particular being 
who does X in order to pursue his chosen purposes). The criterion Albert must comply 
with in this self-reflection, the criterion governing the Gewirthian dialectically necessary 
method is 
 
CDNM: I (Albert) may and must accept a maxim if (and only if) my failure to 
accept it entails that I fail to understand what it is for me to be an agent.  
 
That the CDNM must be the criterion to use (to act on!) in an argument to establish a 
categorically binding principle on action follows simply from understanding the idea of 
                                                        
25
 See Williams, Ethics, p. 62. 
26
 The properties attributed to an agent are those that a being must have in order to be an intelligible subject 
of practical precepting (a being that can ask what it has reason to do). 
14 
 
such a principle. However, that the CDNM is analytic entails that it is dialectically 
necessary for Albert to accept the following criterion of rational action: 
 
 GCRA: If there is a maxim N that is dialectically necessary for me (Albert) to 
adopt then I categorically ought to act on it, and I may act on a maxim M only if 
M is consistent with N.  
 
But this entails that the following maxim is dialectically necessary for Albert: 
 
GMRA: I (Albert) categorically ought to act on any maxim that it is dialectically 
necessary for me to adopt, and I may act on a maxim M only if M is consistent 
with whatever maxims are dialectically necessary for me to adopt.  
 
And, this has the consequence that Albert is categorically bound to accept that he ought 
to act according to a maxim (the GMRA) merely by understanding the concept of a 
categorical imperative.
27
 
                                                        
27
 Although I cannot justify this here, I consider this to be the essential form of Kant’s reasoning when he 
claims that consciousness of the moral law ‘may be called a fact of reason’ (Critique of Practical Reason, 
5:31), which is certain and apodictic (see Critique of Practical Reason, 5:47). I take the fact of reason to be 
the fact that an agent cannot understand the idea of morality (of a categorical imperative, of pure reason 
being practical) without having to accept that pure reason is practical, meaning thereby that to act rationally 
(in the sense of compliance with the GCRA) is an end in itself. Consequently, I consider that Kant’s appeal 
to the fact of reason does not involve an abandonment of his claim to have established the dialectical 
15 
 
 
The CDNM does not prohibit Albert from acting under maxims that are not dialectically 
necessary for him. It only prohibits him from appealing to any considerations that are not 
dialectically necessary for him as premises in the sequence designed to establish a 
dialectically necessary conclusion (either to support or undermine an inference). So, by 
the GCRA, unless (and until) some maxims (additional to the GMRA itself) are shown to 
be dialectically necessary for him, Albert is permitted to adopt any self-coherent maxims 
for possible actions. He is not, therefore, at the outset, prohibited from adopting, as a 
matter of contingent commitment, either altruistic or egoistic maxims, moral maxims or 
amoral maxims. But, as the argument proceeds, he may only retain such contingent 
commitments if he can do so consistently with whatever emerges (additional to the 
GMRA itself) as a dialectically necessary commitment for him. 
 
The argument proceeds through the following steps: 
 
(1) ‘In choosing to do X for E, I (Albert) necessarily attach a value to E sufficient to 
motivate me to do something to bring about E’ = ‘I necessarily care about E 
enough to move me to do something to bring E about’ = ‘I necessarily proactively 
want E’.    
(2) ‘If doing X (or having Y) is necessary for me to pursue or achieve E then I ought 
to do X (or ought to act to ensure that I obtain or keep Y), or give up my pursuit 
                                                                                                                                                                     
necessity of the moral law (that it is connected entirely a priori with the concept of the will of a rational 
being as such) in Groundwork., Chapter III.  
16 
 
of E’. This is the Principle of Instrumental Reason or Hypothetical Imperatives 
(PHI). 
(3) ‘If I fail to accept that I must structure my actions according to the PHI then I fail 
to understand what it is for me to be an agent (because I then fail to understand 
that as an agent I am trying voluntarily to achieve a purpose by doing 
something)’, which is to say that the PHI is dialectically necessary for Albert to 
accept.
28
 Consequently, there is at least one maxim N (the PHI) to instantiate the 
GCRA.  
(4) ‘If Y is a GCA, then it is dialectically necessary for me to accept ‘I ought to want 
to have Y proactively, for my purposes, whatever they might be’, which means 
that it is dialectically necessary for me to accept the self-referring prescription, 
SROa, ‘I ought to defend my having the GCAs, for my purposes, whatever they 
might be’. SROa can be expressed in a number of equivalent ways; e.g., ‘I 
categorically instrumentally ought to defend my having the GCAs’ = ‘I ought to 
defend my having the GCAs, unless (and only unless) I am willing to suffer 
generic damage to my ability to act’29  = ‘I ought to defend my having the GCAs, 
unless (and only unless) I do not (contingently) will to be (or continue to be) an 
                                                        
28
 Compare Kant, according to whom ‘Whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive 
influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that are within his power’ is analytic. 
(Groundwork, 4:417). The PHI is not analytic (if it were, it would be impossible for agents not to follow it); 
it is dialectically necessary (they ought to follow it if they are rational in the sense of acting consistently 
with the idea that they are agents). What is analytic is the statement that the PHI is dialectically necessary.  
29
 This condition is expressed this way because not all GCAs are necessary for the very possibility of 
action. (See footnote 17 supra).  
17 
 
agent’’.  I will frequently state this simply as ‘I ought to oppose unwilled 
interference with my having the GCAs’. The statement that this self-referring 
‘ought’ is dialectically necessary for me will be abbreviated as {SROa}Albert.
30
 
 
While the content of SROa is that Albert has a categorically instrumental reason to 
defend his having the GCAs, the reason why he must act under SROa, and so accept that 
whether or not he ought to defend his having the GCAs depends on his (contingent) 
willingness to be and continue to be an agent or successful agent, and on his (contingent) 
willingness alone, is not instrumental. Although his having the GCAs is necessary for 
him to pursue/achieve whatever his purposes, SROa is not something he must accept in 
order to pursue/achieve his purposes. He must ascribe to SROa in order to be consistent 
with the idea that he is an agent, which is the idea that he does X (whatever X is) 
voluntarily for whatever E he has chosen. 
 
(5) Because I generically need to have the GCAs in order to defend them, I will not 
be able to defend my having them if Brenda prevents me from having them, 
‘{SROa}Albert  {Brenda ought not to interfere with my having the GCAs unless 
(and only unless) I am willing to suffer generic damage to my ability act}Albert‘ = 
                                                        
30
 A proposition in face brackets is dialectically necessary, the subscript indicating for whom it is 
dialectically necessary. 
18 
 
‘{BRO}Albert‘  ‘{I have a right to non-interference with my GCAs}Albert = 
{AR}Albert.’
31
 
 
Gewirth’s main argument for this rests on the claim that if Albert considers that he ought 
to do X by some prescriptive criterion that requires him to do X, then he must, by the 
same criterion, consider that he ought to have the necessary means to do X.
32
 So, since 
Albert categorically instrumentally ought to defend his having the GCAs (i.e., 
categorically ought in order to pursue/achieve his purposes to defend his having the 
GCAs), Brenda categorically ought in order for Albert to pursue or achieve his 
purposes not to interfere with Albert’s having the GCAs, which is to say that SROa 
entails BROa. SROa does not entail that Brenda categorically ought not to interfere with 
Albert’s having the GCAs in order for Brenda to pursue/achieve her purposes (i.e., SROa 
does not entail BROb). However, since it is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept 
SROa, it is not merely in Albert’s generic interests for him to hold BROa (AR), but 
dialectically necessary for Albert to hold BROa (AR). In other words, Albert has two 
reasons for holding AR: it is in his generic interests to hold AR and it is dialectically 
                                                        
31
 The generic rights are argued to be positive as well as negative; i.e., they are argued to be rights to 
assistance as well as rights to non-interference. For convenience, I shall, in the main, only follow the track 
of the claims as claims to negative rights. The claims as positive rights are not derived from the claims as 
negative rights, but are parallel to them: I need assistance to secure my having the GCAs when I cannot do 
so by my own unaided efforts as much as I need non-interference. (See Alan Gewirth,  ‘Replies to My 
Critics’, in Edward J. Regis, Jr. (ed.), Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism: Critical Essays with a Reply by Alan 
Gewirth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 192-255 at pp. 228-229.  
32
 See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, pp. 91-92. 
19 
 
necessary for him to hold AR. Furthermore, since it is only because the PHI is 
dialectically necessary that Albert must regard the fact that he categorically needs to have 
the GCAs as providing him with a reason to defend his GCAs, the fact that AR is 
dialectically necessary for Albert takes precedence over the fact that it is in Albert’s 
generic interests to hold AR. Therefore, the claim that the PHI, SROa, and AR are 
dialectically necessary for Albert cannot be reduced to the claim that it is in Albert’s 
generic interests to comply with the PHI, SROa, or AR.
33
 
 
If Williams’ objections are properly directed at the Gewirthian argument, then this is the 
step that they are primarily directed against. As I will show, when replying to his 
objections, there are also other ways of defending this step. 
 
(6) By the Argument from the Sufficiency of Agency (ASA),
34
 {AR}Albert  {I am 
an agent  AR}Albert.
35
 
 
The ASA may be summarized as follows: 
 
 In order for me to deny ‘I am an agent  AR’, I must assert ‘AR  I have D’ 
(where D is a property I do not, as an agent, necessarily have), by which I 
                                                        
33
 See Beyleveld and Bos, ‘The Foundational Role of the Principle of Instrumental Reason’. 
34
 See Gewirth, Reason and Morality, p.110. 
35
 What the ASA purports to show is that if my being an agent is my dialectically necessary ratio 
cognoscendi for my claim to have AR then it is dialectically necessary for me to accept that it is also the 
ratio essendi for my having AR. 
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contend, ‘If I do not (or did not) have D then I do not (or would not) have the 
generic rights’. But given {AR}Albert, I implicitly deny that I am an agent if I deny 
AR. It follows that I deny that I am an agent if I assert, ‘AR  I have D’. In order 
not to deny that I am an agent I must deny ’AR  I have D’, which means that I 
must accept ‘I am an agent  AR’. Therefore, {AR}Albert  {I am an agent  
AR}Albert. 
  
(7) By the logical principle of universalization (LPU)
36
 operating on ‘I am an agent 
 AR’ within ‘{AR}Albert  {I am an agent  AR}Albert’, {Brenda is an agent  
I ought not to interfere with Brenda’s having the GCAs, unless she is willing to 
suffer generic damage to her ability to act}Albert  {Brenda has a right to non-
interference with her GCAs}Albert  
(8) By the LPU, {All agents have a right to non-interference with their having the 
GCAs)all agents = {The PGC}all agents 
 
Williams explicitly accepts the validity of steps (7) and (8). Whether or not he accepts 
step (6) is not certain as he does not consider or mention the ASA. However, the 
argument he presents moves, without comment, from my claiming my right ‘solely 
                                                        
36
 This may be stated as ‘If the fact that A has  is sufficient to infer that A has , then the fact that B has  
is sufficient to infer that  B has ’. The principle depends, as Williams recognizes, merely on the meaning 
of ‘sufficient to infer’. In its application here, ‘having ’ is ‘being an agent’; and ‘having ’ is ‘having the 
generic rights’. 
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because I am a rational agent’ to ‘rational agency alone is the ground of the right’,37 
which suggests that he does not see a problem with step (6). 
 
 
III Response to Williams 
   
a Reply to Williams’ First Objection: The Argument for Dialectically Necessary Mutual 
Recognition 
 
Williams’ first objection does invalidate the reasoning he offers for consideration. But 
although many philosophers accept this as being Gewirth’s reasoning,38 it is not. The 
Gewirthian argument derives {AR}Albert from {SROa}Albert, which is not equivalent to ‘I 
am necessarily opposed to interference with my having the GCAs’ (including ‘I am 
necessarily opposed to interference with my basic freedom’, where basic freedom is a 
GCA). And while it is true that SROa (= ‘I categorically instrumentally ought to oppose 
interference with my having the GCAs in order to achieve the purposes I choose to 
pursue’) is derived in part from CIa (= ‘I categorically instrumentally need to have the 
GCAs in order to achieve the purposes I choose to pursue’), {SROa}Albert, is not derived 
solely from CIa.  It is derived from ‘It is dialectically necessary for me to structure my 
                                                        
37
 Williams, Ethics, p. 60. 
38
 See, e.g., James P. Sterba, ‘Building on Gewirth: A Defense of Morality’, in M. Boylan (ed.), Gewirth: 
Critical Essays on Action, Rationality, and Community (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1999), pp. 159-182 at p. 172; and Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 133. 
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practical reasoning in accordance with the PHI’ coupled with CIa, which coupling 
provides the dialectically necessary PHI with a dialectically necessary substantive 
content.  So, it is irrelevant that ‘I necessarily want my basic freedom’ does not 
universalize to ‘I necessarily want your basic freedom’. And it is equally irrelevant that 
SROa does not universalize to ‘I (Albert) categorically ought to oppose interference with 
Brenda’s possession of the GCAs against her will.’39 Unless Williams wishes to deny that 
the PHI is dialectically necessary,
40
 what he has to show is that {SROa}Albert does not 
entail {SROb}Albert, in which SROb has the same prescriptive force for Albert as SROa 
has for him (and SROb has for Brenda). In other words, he has to show that {SROa}Albert  
does not entail {Albert is an agent  ‘Albert ought not to interfere with Brenda’s having 
the GCAs against her will}Albert = {Albert is an agent  Brenda has the generic 
rights}Albert  {BR}Albert.
41
 
 
However, using the reasoning involved in the ASA (see step [6] in the argument above], 
{SROa}Albert entails {Albert is an agent  SROa}Albert,
42
 which, uncontroversially, 
entails (by parallel reasoning) {Brenda is an agent  SROb}Brenda. 
                                                        
39
 It does not universalize because I (Albert) do not categorically need Brenda to have the GCAs (or to be 
able to pursue/achieve her purposes) for my purposes. 
40
 In which case he would have to deny that there are any reasons for action at all, and he is not that kind of 
normative sceptic. 
41
 It should be clear that if this entailment holds then the FPU is established as a necessary truth. 
42 In order for Albert to deny ‘Albert is an agent  SROa’, Albert must assert ‘SROa  Albert has D’ 
(where D is a property he does not, as an agent, necessarily have), by which he contends, ‘If I do not (or did 
not) have D then I do not (or would not) have to hold SROa’. But given {SROa}Albert, Albert implicitly 
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Now, ‘Albert is an agent  SROa’ states that the sufficient reason why Albert must 
defend his having the GCAs from interference against his will is that he is an agent, and 
‘Brenda is an agent  SROb’ states that the sufficient reason why Brenda must defend 
her having the GCAs from interference against her will is that she is an agent. So Albert 
has the same dialectically necessary reason for abiding by SROa as Brenda has for 
abiding by SROb. It follows that Albert must consider Brenda’s claim that she ought to 
do what SROb requires to be as justified as his claim that he ought to do what SROa 
requires. This does not merely amount to Albert conceding that Brenda is as rational in 
following SROb as he is in following SROa. Albert must consider that it is simply by 
virtue of his possession of the generic properties that make him an agent that he is duty 
bound to do what SROa requires (defend his possession of the GCAs from interference 
against his will). But this means that Albert is required to take the fact that he is an agent 
(the fact that he has these generic properties, ‘possesses agency in his person’) as laying 
down the rules for his behaviour in relation to his possession of the GCAs. Albert must, 
in other words, recognize agency in his person (not as an end in itself as Kant has it), 
but as the legislative authority that delegates to his (contingent) will supreme authority 
over what he may or may not do in relation to the disposal of his person. Equally, it is 
dialectically necessary for Albert to recognize that Brenda is required to recognize 
                                                                                                                                                                     
denies that he is an agent if he rejects SROa. It follows that Albert denies that he is an agent if he asserts, 
‘SROa  Albert has D’. In order not to deny that he is an agent Albert must reject ’SROa  Albert has D’, 
which means that he must accept ‘Albert is an agent  SROa’. Therefore, {SROa}Albert  {Albert is an 
agent  SROa}Albert.. 
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agency in her person as the legislative authority that delegates to her (contingent) will 
supreme authority over what she may or may not do in relation to disposal of her person. 
 
So, {SROa}Albert   {{SROb}Brenda}Albert. But, by the reasoning involved in the ASA, this 
entails {Albert is an agent  {SROb}Brenda}Albert. Similarly, this entails {Albert is an 
agent  {Brenda is an agent  SROb}Brenda}Albert. So, Albert must consider that the 
reason why Brenda must consider that agency in her person is the supreme authority over 
what she may or may not do in relation to disposal of her person is that Albert is an 
agent. So, it is dialectically necessary for Albert to consider that agency in his person is 
the legislative authority that makes it dialectically necessary for Brenda to consider that 
agency in her person is the legislative authority that delegates to her will supreme 
authority over what she may or may not do in relation to disposal of her person.  
Therefore, it is dialectically necessary for Albert to hold that the reason why he must 
accept SROa and the reason why Brenda must accept SROb is the same legislative 
reason, which is that Albert is an agent. But if Albert must hold that it is agency in 
Albert’s person that requires Brenda to hold that her will is the supreme authority over 
her disposal of her person, then Albert must accept that Brenda’s will is the supreme 
authority over her disposal of her person. This is the Argument for Dialectically 
Necessary Mutual Recognition.   
 
Suppose, then, that Albert were to interfere with Brenda’s possession of the GCAs. If he 
does so, she will not be able to comply with SROb. It follows that Albert must consider 
that he ought not to interfere with Brenda’s possession of the GCAs against her will, 
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which is to say that Albert must grant Brenda the generic rights. If Albert denies that he 
ought not to interfere with Brenda’s possession of the GCAs against her will, he denies 
that Brenda’s will is the supreme authority over her disposal of her person, which it is 
dialectically necessary for him to accept. This is because, if Albert interferes with 
Brenda’s possession of the GCAs against her will, she will not be able to defend her 
possession of the GCAs, and this will be because of what Albert has willed. For Albert to 
think that it is not impermissible for him to interfere, is for him to hold that his will, not 
Brenda’s will, is the supreme authority over what she may or may not do in relation to 
her disposal of her person.. 
 
To this it might be objected that if an earthquake deprives Brenda of the GCAs, she also 
will not be able to defend her possession of the GCAs. Consequently, it is not true that 
Albert must think that whether or not Brenda ought to defend her GCAs is subject to her 
will and her will alone (which is what is meant  by saying that Brenda’s will is the 
supreme authority over her disposal of her person). What Brenda ought to do is also 
subject to what it is possible for Brenda to do. If Albert deprives Brenda of the GCAs, all 
that he is doing is rendering it impossible for her to defend her possession of the GCAs. 
So, in this event, instead of thinking that he ought not to interfere with Brenda’s 
possession of the GCAs against her will, he might simply stop thinking that Brenda ought 
to defend her possession of the GCAs.
43
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 See Colin Davies, ‘Egoism and Consistency’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1975), pp. 19-27 at 
p. 23. 
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But it is not simply interference with Brenda’s possession of the GCAs that we are 
considering, but Albert’s view on his willed interference against Brenda’s will.  So, while 
it is true that whether or not Brenda ought to do what SROb requires is subject to it being 
possible for her to do so, for this objection to be relevant, it must claim that Albert may 
consider that Brenda ought (when possible) to defend her possession of the GCAs from 
interference against her will, subject to her will alone (which Albert must accept), subject 
to his contingent will. This is not coherent. 
 
For Albert to have to consider that it is agency in his person that legislates that Brenda’s 
contingent will is the supreme authority over her disposal of her person, is not for Albert 
to have to consider that it is his contingent will that legislates this. It is Albert’s having a 
will that legislates this, just as it is Albert’s having a will that legislates to him that his 
contingent will is the supreme authority over his disposal of his person.   
 
Consequently, {SROa}Albert entails {BR}Albert.
44
 
 
The only way out of this is to try to deny that Brenda and Albert do have the same reason 
for their claims. This can, however, only be the case if what is predicated of Brenda by 
Albert in ‘Brenda is an agent’ is not the same as what is predicated of Albert by Albert in 
                                                        
44
 In Beyleveld, Dialectical Necessity of Morality, (e.g., pp. 263-264), and Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Gewirth and 
Kant on Justifying the Supreme Principle of Morality’, in M. Boylan (ed.), Gewirth: Critical Essays on 
Action, Rationality, and Community (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 97-117  at pp. 
105-106, I argued that this universalisation holds (as, indeed, it must if the argument is valid), but not in 
this way. I now think that the arguments presented there are too elliptical. 
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‘Albert is an agent’. What might such predication be? Perhaps ‘Albert is an agent’ is to 
be read as ‘Albert is that unique being who necessarily values Albert’s contingently 
chosen purposes’, whereas ‘Brenda’ is an agent’ states ‘Brenda is that unique being who 
necessarily values Brenda’s contingently chosen purposes’.  
 
But, on such a reading, it will not even follow by parallel reasoning that {SROa}Albert 
entails {SROb}Brenda, because Albert will now be the only possible agent from his 
perspective as an agent.
45
 
 
So, if it is intelligible for Albert to even imagine that there could possibly be any agents 
other than himself, Albert must, in identifying himself as that unique being who only 
necessarily values the purposes he has contingently chosen, see this unique identity as a 
function of a universal relation that is shared by all beings who only necessarily value the 
purposes they have contingently chosen. In other words, Albert can only think of himself 
as the particular agent he is by also thinking of himself as just one member of the class of 
beings who stand in the universal relation to their own contingently chosen purposes of 
necessarily valuing them. Conversely, since from Albert’s internal perspective as an 
agent and from Brenda’s internal perspective as an agent, recognition of the generic 
perspective on being an agent mutually entails recognition of the particularized 
perspective on being an agent (which amounts to assertion of the analyticity of the PRJ 
from an agent’s internal perspective as an agent), Brenda and Albert do necessarily have 
                                                        
45
 For discussion of this ‘way out’ in the context of the application of the ASA at step (6), see Beyleveld 
Dialectical Necessity of Morality, pp. 288-300.  
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the same reason (and not merely parallel reasons) for considering themselves bound to 
defend their own GCAs from unwilled interference. Most importantly, because of the 
analyticity of the PRJ, {BR}Albert and{AR}Brenda are binding on Albert and Brenda as real 
agents (the particular agents that they are). 
 
 
b Reply to Williams’ Second Objection 
 
It is true that if I must consider that I have a right to have the GCAs because I necessarily 
want them, then I must claim a right to all my contingently chosen purposes, which is 
absurd. But I do not necessarily want to have the GCAs. As I have already noted, the PHI 
is not analytic but dialectically necessary and my having the GCAs is categorically 
instrumental for my purposes. So, if I want to pursue a purpose, I instrumentally ought to 
want to have them (regardless of what that purpose is, for that purpose). This means that 
if I respond rationally (i.e., consistently with an understanding of what it is for me to be 
an agent) I necessarily will want them in order to pursue/achieve my purposes. But this 
does not mean that I necessarily will want them, as I might not respond rationally.  And 
even if I do respond rationally, it is entirely possible for me not to want to continue to be 
an agent for its own sake, hence not to want to continue to have the GCAs except for my 
particular contingent purposes (which might merely be to end my life by my own 
actions). The case of my particular contingent purposes and that of my possession of the 
GCAs is entirely different. I necessarily want to achieve those purposes I choose to 
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pursue, but I necessarily ought to want to possess the GCAs in order to pursue or achieve 
whatever purposes I choose to pursue. 
 
It is revealing that Williams presents the argument in terms of my basic freedom rather 
than the GCAs. ‘My basic freedom’ can refer to a number of things, which creates room 
for equivocation. For example, it can refer to my power to choose purposes. This is 
something that I do necessarily value. Since I choose my purposes by exercising my 
power of choice, and necessarily value my purposes in so doing, I necessarily value my 
power to choose purposes.  But, in so valuing my power of choice (or its exercise), I 
value it subsistently, not as a GCA; and not as an end to be pursued for its own sake. To 
be a GCA it must be a necessary means by which I pursue or achieve (any of) my 
purposes, which it is not. To be an end to be pursued, it must be something that I might 
be an agent and not have; but its possession (or exercise) defines (at least in part) what it 
is to be an agent. The statement that I possess the power of choice is analytically 
connected to the statement that I am an agent. On the other hand, freedom of action 
(having the capacity, or being in the position, to act in accordance with the exercise of 
one’s power of choice) is a GCA. But this is not something that I necessarily have or 
necessarily do value as against something that I necessarily need and ought to value 
categorically instrumentally. 
 
 
c Reply to Williams’ Third Objection 
 
30 
 
There are only a limited number of positions I can take on the permissibility or otherwise 
of interference with my dialectically necessary commitment to possess the GCAs viewed 
as categorically instrumental to my purposes. First, I can take such interference to be 
required (non-interference is impermissible even when it is against my will). This implies 
that I ought to want unwilled interference. Secondly, I can take unwilled interference to 
be positively permissible (the interferer has a right so to interfere, implying that I have a 
duty not to resist such unwilled interference). If so, I ought to want unwilled interference 
when it occurs. Thirdly, I can take such interference to be impermissible (implying that 
the interferer has a duty not to interfere unless I am willing to permit interference). This 
implies that I unconditionally ought to be opposed to unwilled interference.  Or, fourthly, 
I can take it that such interference is neither positively permissible nor impermissible 
(implying that I do not have a duty not to resist such interference and that the interferer 
does not have a duty not to interfere). This does not imply that I ought to want unwilled 
interference nor that I ought to be opposed to unwilled interference. It, therefore, permits 
(i.e., does not prohibit) me from not being opposed to unwilled interference. 
 
But it is dialectically necessary for me to be opposed to unwilled interference, which 
prohibits me from not being opposed to unwilled interference, and the only possible 
position compatible with this is the stance that unwilled interference is impermissible 
(that I have a right to non-interference).  
 
This, in essence, is my Argument from Attitudinal Consistency.
46
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 See Beyleveld, Dialectical Necessity of Morality, pp. 95-101. 
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If Williams’ objection is directed at the actual Gewirthian argument then it must be taken 
to rest on (indeed, to constitute) the claim that for me to hold that unwilled interference 
with my having the GCAs is neither positively permissible nor impermissible is 
consistent with it being dialectically necessary for me to be opposed unconditionally to 
unwilled interference. But the Argument from Attitudinal Consistency shows this claim 
to be false. 
 
But is it not the case that {SROa)Albert is compatible with me (Albert) allowing others to 
interfere? I must only desire non-interference insofar as non-interference is instrumental 
to my purposes, and my purpose might be to want you to interfere. Indeed! But only on 
condition that I am willing to suffer generic damage to my ability to act, i.e., only on 
condition that the interference is not unwilled by me. The point is this. If I, compatibly 
with {SROa)Albert, permit you to interfere, I do not permit you to interfere against my will. 
I merely permit you to interfere in accordance with my will. Because SROa is 
dialectically necessary for me, I categorically may not permit unwilled interference. And 
this means that I must think that the non-impermissibility (or otherwise) of your 
interference is subject to my contingent will alone, not your will, which is precisely what 
is meant by my having to consider that I have the generic rights. 
 
I (Albert) need to distinguish between what I must hold as an agent in acting for or in 
intending to act for a particular contingent purpose, whatever this purpose might be, and 
what I must hold by virtue of having the properties that make me an agent per se (a being 
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able to act for and intend to act for particular contingent purposes). In acting or intending 
to act (i.e., in proactive mode), I categorically ought to defend having my GCAs. I fail to 
understand what it is for me to be an agent in proactive mode if I do not recognize that I 
ought to defend having my GCAs. This ‘ought’ is not subject to my contingent will. 
However, as an agent per se, I am not required to act to ensure my continued existence as 
an agent in proactive mode. Thus, from my perspective as an agent per se, I am not 
required to defend my having the GCAs categorically. I do not fail to understand what it 
is for me to be an agent per se if I do not accept that I categorically ought to defend my 
having the GCAs. Nevertheless, I do fail to understand what it is for me to be an agent 
per se if I do not accept that in acting or intending to act (which will necessarily be for 
some particular contingent purpose/s) I categorically ought to defend my having the 
GCAs. Hence, it is dialectically necessary (from my perspective as an agent per se) to 
recognize a necessary content for my actual and intended actions. But because to act is to 
do something voluntarily for a purpose I have chosen, it is not dialectically necessary 
(from my perspective as an agent per se) to act to maintain my existence as a being 
capable of acting and intending to act. Hence, it is dialectically necessary for me (Albert) 
(from my perspective as an agent per se) to accept SROa, with the implication that it is 
dialectically necessary for me to consider the requirement for me to defend my having the 
GCAs (and only my GCAs) to be subject to my contingent will (whether or not to 
maintain being able to act) and to my contingent will alone. 
 
 
d Another Argument 
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There is another argument, with which these replies and the reasoning in step (5) of the 
canonical Gewirthian argument (as presented in this paper) are all consistent.
47
  
 
It should be clear that from {SROa}Albert coupled with the FPU (= ‘It is dialectically 
necessary for agents to treat the dialectically necessary normative commitments of any 
agent as their own’), {BR}Albert (hence the dialectical necessity of the PGC) follows. 
 
In fact, given {SROa}Albert, if Albert contingently accepts the FPU (whether or not it is a 
necessary truth) then he must accept BR (that Brenda has the generic rights) on pain of 
contradicting this contingent acceptance. But this entails that {SROa}Albert entails 
{AR}Albert. This is because Albert’s contingent acceptance of the FPU requires him to 
attach the same significance and importance to Brenda’s categorical instrumental need 
for the GCAs (CIb) (hence to {SROb}Brenda), as it is dialectically necessary for Albert to 
attach to his categorical instrumental need for the GCAs (CIa) (i.e., to {SROa}Albert) in 
relation  to what Albert may or may not do. And this has the consequence that Albert 
must grant Brenda the generic rights. 
 
But this entails that the significance and importance that it is dialectically necessary for 
Albert to attach to CIa must be equivalent to {AR}Albert. It simply cannot be the case that, 
merely by attaching the same significance to CIb as it is dialectically necessary for Albert 
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 See Deryck Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human 
Rights’, Human Rights Review 13 (2012), pp. 1-18 at pp. 6-8. 
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to attach (because of {SROa}Albert) to CIa,, Albert is required to grant the generic rights to 
Brenda unless {SROa}Albert entails, indeed, is equivalent to, {AR}Albert.     
 
Since {AR}Albert entails {Albert is an agent  AR}Albert, which (as Williams agrees) 
entails {BR}Albert, this entails that the FPU is a necessary truth (an analytic statement). 
 
Because the PRJ is itself an analytic statement, it must be concluded that the FPU is a 
necessary truth whether or not agents are conceived of generically or as the particular 
agents that they are. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
All these replies lead to the same conclusion, which is that William’s dilemma is false. 
 
At the end of his critique, Williams asks 
 
How can an I that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough 
identity to live a life that respects its own interests? If morality is possible at all, 
does it leave anyone in particular for me to be?
48
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His contention is that if morality is also conceived as categorically binding, then there is 
nothing in particular left for me to be. 
 
In this paper, I have shown that I am categorically bound to accept a substantive impartial 
principle that, at the same time, permits me to live a life that respects my own personal 
interests. This is possible for two reasons. First, the argument for the PGC only requires 
Albert to have impartial regard to his and Brenda’s dialectically necessary commitments: 
Albert is not required (contrary to Williams’ second objection) to treat all of Brenda’s 
reasons impartially: he is not required to treat all her purposes as reasons for him to act, 
only her dialectically necessary reasons. Secondly, Albert’s and Brenda’s dialectically 
necessary commitment is to pursue having their GCAs subject to their respective 
contingent wills. Consequently, both Albert and Brenda must take Albert’s own purposes 
(interests) to be sovereign over the disposal of his person, as they both must take 
Brenda’s purposes to be sovereign over the disposal of her own person. Hence Albert and 
Brenda may conduct their own lives in any ways they prefer (according to their own 
personal practical identities), provided only that they do not interfere with the possession 
of the other’s GCAs against the other’s contingent will. Far from it being the case that the 
idea of being categorically bound to an impartial principle renders unintelligible the idea 
of the individual self, it actually grounds this idea (and the idea of an individual self) 
through the idea of an individual self. 
 
Williams’ dilemma only arises on the supposition that we have an exclusive choice 
between a model in which the purely generic elements of agency wear the trousers, but 
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are empty of content and practical force, and a model driven by contingent elements that 
are essential to making an agent the particular agent that the agent is, which have content 
and practical force, but only provide that agent with reasons to act. But there is another 
option (which, if my arguments are sound, is the only coherent option), and that is to 
view the practical law as the product of a genuine synthesis between these two elements 
that is guided by the PRJ as the analytic principle of practical self-understanding. 
 
In this paper, I have not challenged Williams’ depiction of Kant’s views, which is not to 
say that I accept it; and the way in which I have presented the Gewirthian argument 
renders it much more Kantian than the manner in which it is usually portrayed.
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 This includes Gewirth’s own portrayal. For reasons I have never been able to understand fully, Gewirth 
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Unfortunately, an analysis of the precise relationship between the Gewirthian position I 
have presented here and Kant’s own views must be left for other occasions. 
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